Somali maritime pirates
have often said, if it wasn’t for foreign trawlers, invading their fisheries,
they would never have turned to piracy. John Vidal, with London’s Guardian
newspaper, uses this logic in advocating an international response to suppressing illegal fishing. This is purely ‘pirated spin’, the reality is one successful
pirate attack equals nearly a lifetime worth of earning in the Horn of Africa
region. To quote Treasure Island, “‘Money!’ cried the squire. ‘Have you heard
the story? What were these villains after but money? What do they care for but
money? For what would they risk their rascal carcases but money?’”[1]
This said, there are a couple ways piracy might be less lucrative if a robust
Somali fishing industry were to be resurrected.
Firstly, the Transitional
Federal Government (TFG) needs to define their Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) under
the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 1982. This would
provide the legal basis for proceeding to step two. As long as the reward-risk
ratio for maritime piracy outweighs that of fishing, there won't be much demand
for pirates to become (or go back to) fishing. One successful 'piracy for
ransom' (PFR) or 'kidnapping for ransom' (KFR) could provide the equivalent of
a lifetime's earnings for the average Somali.
The European Union Naval
Force (EU NAVFOR) has been training Ugandan soldiers attached to African
Union's Somalia Mission (AMISOM) to be part of a ‘vessel protection detachment’
(VPD) programme aimed at guarding the transport of supplies to Mogadishu for
AMISOM and the United Nations World Food Programme (UN WFP). It’s a joint UN
Security Council (UN SC) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (S/2011/662,
para 52) programme. The programme sounds similar to one of adding private
security to commercial vessels, the difference here is that they are AMISOM and
WFP vessels which have been chartered by the UN Support Office for the AMISOM (UNSOA)
and the WFP. Logistical challenges of moving VPD to and from charter vessels et
cetera. Once domestic shipping into Somalia transfers from shield of Combine
Maritime Task Force (CMF), NATO and EU NAVFOR in 2014, there needs to be a
multi-pronged strategy.
AMISOM might be a good
entity to have move from a 'on land' police to transitioning VPD units to a
coast guard. As far as fisheries go, the TFG might consider a licensing scheme
to sell fishing licences to non-Somali fishing companies. Assuming the licence
scheme isn't corrupted, it could generate revenue to help fund the coast guard.
The coast guard would be tasked with law and environmental enforcement of the
EEZ.
The fear, as with many
3rd World Countries, is corruption. Galmudug Prison is a great example of why
Western standards are not always the best ideas - this was a multi-million Euro
project built to EU standards and resulted in several hundred convicted pirates
being freed and the guards and their families occupying section of the prison
as "apartments", since it was so much nicer than anywhere else in the
region. Efforts need to have a goal of eventually being self-funding, as the
TFG, Somaliland, Puntland and Galmudug should at one point take control of
self-governance.
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